### AT: NPT CP

#### Perm – do both

#### No solvency for prolif – global nuclear power is spreading, that’s Barber and Williams – NFU can’t stop prolif once countries have nuclear materials – DOD action is key:

#### First, exports – spreading SMR tech means states can’t access fuel to use in weapons

#### Second, diplomacy – only improving our nuclear industrial base allows negotiations which spillover to broader non-proliferation agreements

### BSS 2AC

#### Our framework is that the alternative should be judged on the efficacy of its response to existing institutional practices

#### This means that the neg should have to answer the following questions – what is the alternative institution/social order that should be put into place? Is that feasible? What would have to be done to create that change and what would be the consequences of those actions?

#### Absent these questions shifts in knowledge production are useless – governments’ obey institutional logics that exist independently of individuals and constrain decisionmaking

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(Colin, Agents, Structures and International Relations: Politics as Ontology, pgs. 48-50

One important aspect of this relational ontology is that these relations constitute our identity as social actors. According to this relational model of societies, one is what one is, by virtue of the relations within which one is embedded. A worker is only a worker by virtue of his/her relationship to his/her employer and vice versa. ‘Our social being is constituted by relations and our social acts presuppose them.’ At any particular moment in time an individual may be implicated in all manner of relations, each exerting its own peculiar causal effects. This ‘lattice-work’ of relations constitutes the structure of particular societies and endures despite changes in the individuals occupying them. Thus, the relations, the structures, are ontologically distinct from the individuals who enter into them. At a minimum, the social sciences are concerned with two distinct, although mutually interdependent, strata. There is an ontological difference between people and structures: ‘people are not relations, societies are not conscious agents’. Any attempt to explain one in terms of the other should be rejected. If there is an ontological difference between society and people, however, we need to elaborate on the relationship between them. Bhaskar argues that we need a system of mediating concepts, encompassing both aspects of the duality of praxis into which active subjects must fit in order to reproduce it: that is, a system of concepts designating the ‘point of contact’ between human agency and social structures. This is known as a ‘positioned practice’ system. In many respects, the idea of ‘positioned practice’ is very similar to Pierre Bourdieu’s notion of *habitus*. Bourdieu is primarily concerned with what individuals do in their daily lives. He is keen to refute the idea that social activity can be understood solely in terms of individual decision-making, or as determined by surpa-individual objective structures. Bourdieu’s notion of the *habitus* can be viewed as a bridge-building exercise across the explanatory gap between two extremes. Importantly, the notion of a habitus can only be understood in relation to the concept of a ‘social field’. According to Bourdieu, a social field is ‘a network, or a configuration, of objective relations between positions objectively defined’. A social field, then, refers to a structured system of social positions occupied by individuals and/or institutions – the nature of which defines the situation for their occupants. This is a social field whose form is constituted in terms of the relations which define it as a field of a certain type. A *habitus* (positioned practices) is a mediating link between individuals’ subjective worlds and the socio-cultural world into which they are born and which they share with others. The power of the habitus derives from the thoughtlessness of habit and habituation, rather than consciously learned rules. The habitus is imprinted and encoded in a socializing process that commences during early childhood. It is inculcated more by experience than by explicit teaching. Socially competent performances are produced as a matter of routine, without explicit reference to a body of codified knowledge, and without the actors necessarily knowing what they are doing (in the sense of being able adequately to explain what they are doing). As such, the *habitus* can be seen as the site of ‘internalization of reality and the externalization of internality.’ Thus social practices are produced in, and by, the encounter between: (1) the *habitus* and its dispositions; (2) the constraints and demands of the socio-cultural field to which the habitus is appropriate or within; and (3) the dispositions of the individual agents located within both the socio-cultural field and the *habitus*. When placed within Bhaskar’s stratified complex social ontology the model we have is as depicted in Figure 1. The explanation of practices will require all three levels. Society, as field of relations, exists prior to, and is independent of, individual and collective understandings at any particular moment in time; that is, social action requires the conditions for action. Likewise, given that behavior is seemingly recurrent, patterned, ordered, institutionalised, and displays a degree of stability over time, there must be sets of relations and rules that govern it. Contrary to individualist theory, these relations, rules and roles are not dependent upon either knowledge of them by particular individuals, or the existence of actions by particular individuals; that is, their explanation cannot be reduced to consciousness or to the attributes of individuals. These emergent social forms must possess emergent powers. This leads on to arguments for the reality of society based on a causal criterion. Society, as opposed to the individuals that constitute it, is, as Foucault has put it, ‘a complex and independent reality that has its own laws and mechanisms of reaction, its regulations as well as its possibility of disturbance. This new reality is society…It becomes necessary to reflect upon it, upon its specific characteristics, its constants and its variables’.

#### Debating the aff is key to solve it – imaginative familiarity with nuclear power creates trust and overcomes public misunderstanding – creates tipping point for new facilities

Butler, Parkhill, & Pidgeon 11

(Catherine, Research Fellow at Cardiff University, Karen, Research Fellow at Cardiff University, Nicholas, Professor of Environmental Psychology at Cardiff University, “Nuclear Power After Japan: The Social Dimensions”, November-December 2011, http://www.environmentmagazine.org/Archives/Back%20Issues/2011/November-December%202011/Nuclear-full.html)

Nuclear power has, beyond its beginnings where “glamorous reactors” were anticipated with “a great sense of excitement,” had a tumultuous relationship with the public.18 It has been characterized as a “uniquely dreaded” technology due to its long-standing association with atomic weaponry, invisible and long-lasting effects of radiation, and concerns about waste disposal.19 In the 1980s after the nuclear incident at Three Mile Island (1979) and the disaster at Chernobyl (1986), public opposition to nuclear power was at an all-time high in many countries. Indeed, data from the United States even before Chernobyl suggested that public opposition to nuclear new build rose from around 20% in the 1970s to more than 60% in the early 1980s.20 Other research has identified public distrust of regulators, government, and the nuclear industry to manage risks responsibly and provide truthful information to the public as a key reason for erosion of support.21¶ Over the past 10 years opinion polling has indicated a reduction in opposition. For example, a global poll by the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) and the Nuclear Energy Agency showed in 2010 that support for nuclear energy had increased in countries such as the United States, Japan, Sweden, Finland, and the United Kingdom.22 Looking specifically at the United Kingdom, polling of the British public conducted in early 2010 found a very balanced picture, with 46% of those questioned favoring replacement or expansion of the existing nuclear capacity in Britain as compared to 47% who wanted it closed or phased out at the end of the existing program.23 However, a closer look at the national polling data shows a more complex picture, with a large proportion of recent national support remaining fragile—a conditional or “reluctant acceptance” at best.24¶ From such research we can posit that during the short to medium term following Fukushima, many “reluctant acceptors” may withdraw their support for nuclear power and in particular for nuclear new build. Thus opposition during this time would correspondingly increase. Early polling research suggests this is exactly the case, with many countries seeing a rise in opposition that outweighs support even by the thinnest margins; the United States is a notable exception where support for nuclear power is marginally higher than opposition (see Figure 1).25 In the case of Japan, more than half of those who indicated they now oppose nuclear energy to produce electricity do so due to the events in Japan; significant proportions of the public in other countries also state this is the case (see Figure 1). On the basis of such findings, we might expect that those communities who are proposed as hosts for a new reactor may now oppose such developments.¶ For communities with no experience with a nuclear facility, it is likely that within the short to medium term, potential public contestation surrounding nuclear power may indeed prove to be a stumbling block.26 However, this is not necessarily true of all proposed reactor sites. For example, in the United Kingdom proposed sites are either on or adjacent to an existing nuclear power station. Previous research tells us that the response of people in such communities does not always mirror that obtained from national samples. While reluctant acceptance may be a feature of discourse in such communities and Fukushima may prompt the “extraordinariness” of living close to a nuclear facility to cause momentary reframings of nuclear power as a risk and threat issue, there are some important qualitative nuances to public perceptions that may lead to differing medium- to long-trends following Fukushima.27 Examples include the importance of social familiarity, which through social networks connected to the power station (i.e., either being or knowing a power station worker) or through imaginary positioning (being able to imagine how workers think, feel, and follow working practices) demystifies the power station as a distant institutional organization.28 As such, trust in power station workers is engendered. Although hidden anxieties may come to the surface in light of Fukushima, these could also be moderated by the distancing of the events as irrelevant to localized contexts and working practices, serving to reify the perceived safety of local plants (and trust in plant operators) rather than undermining it.29

#### Perm – do both – doing the aff while considering capitalism allows us to check back against economically unjust effects of the plan

#### Additionally, The best route to improving decision-making is through discussion about public policy

#### Mutually accessible information – There is a wide swath of literature on governmental policy topics – that ensures there will be informed, predictable, and in-depth debate over the aff’s decision. Individual policymaking is highly variable depending on the person and inaccessible to outsiders.

#### Harder decisions make better decisionmakers – The problems facing public policymakers are a magnitude greater than private decisions. We all know plans don’t actually happen, but practicing imagining the consequences of our decisions in the high-stakes games of public policymaking makes other decisionmaking easier.

#### Policymaking solves DOGMATISM – Most problems are not black and white but have complex, uncertain interactions. By declaring that \_\_\_\_\_ is always bad, they prevent us from understanding the nuances of an incredibly important and complex issue. This is the epitome of dogmatism

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(Thomas E., James K., and Tracly K., Asst. professor School of Social Service Administration U. of Chicago, professor of Social Work, and doctoral student School of Social Work, “Student debates in policy courses: promoting policy practice skills and knowledge through active learning,” Journal of Social Work Education, Spr/Summer 2001, EBSCOhost)

John Dewey, the philosopher and educational reformer, suggested that the initial advance in the development of reflective thought occurs in the transition from holding fixed, static ideas to an attitude of doubt and questioning engendered by exposure to alternative views in social discourse (Baker, 1955, pp. 36-40). Doubt, confusion, and conflict resulting from discussion of diverse perspectives "force comparison, selection, and reformulation of ideas and meanings" (Baker, 1955, p. 45). Subsequent educational theorists have contended that learning requires openness to divergent ideas in combination with the ability to synthesize disparate views into a purposeful resolution (Kolb, 1984; Perry, 1970). On the one hand, clinging to the certainty of one's beliefs risks dogmatism, rigidity, and the inability to learn from new experiences. On the other hand, if one's opinion is altered by every new experience, the result is insecurity, paralysis, and the inability to take effective action. The educator's role is to help students develop the capacity to incorporate new and sometimes conflicting ideas and experiences into a coherent cognitive framework. Kolb suggests that, "if the education process begins by bringing out the learner's beliefs and theories, examining and testing them, and then integrating the new, more refined ideas in the person's belief systems, the learning process will be facilitated" (p. 28).

The authors believe that involving students in substantive debates challenges them to learn and grow in the fashion described by Dewey and Kolb. Participation in a debate stimulates clarification and critical evaluation of the evidence, logic, and values underlying one's own policy position. In addition, to debate effectively students must understand and accurately evaluate the opposing perspective. The ensuing tension between two distinct but legitimate views is designed to yield a reevaluation and reconstruction of knowledge and beliefs pertaining to the issue.

#### The only way to reform the energy system is for critical scholars to learn the technical language and bureaucratic regulations of energy policy – essential to address growing environmental and geopolitical challenges of energy policy

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Why is the Sociology of Energy Important to Environmental Policy and Research? Despite these limitations, other disciplines generally offer weaker accounts of the human role in energy production and consumption. In fact, efforts by physics, engineering and economics derived from the study of macro-level processes often mislead analysis by misrepresenting the micro-level social processes that control energy flows and shape socioenvironmental systems—processes about which sociology has a good deal to say (Lutzenhiser, 1993). Although the efficiency of energy use has improved in the United States over the past 20 years—reversing a centuries-long trend of increasing energy consumption (Morrison, 1992), neither market nor policy interventions have been particularly successful in reducing energy flows to anywhere near the theoretical minima that energy analysts estimate can maintain quality of life (Cherfas, 1991). One important contribution of sociology, then, lies in its ability to investigate the micro-social processes that promote consumption and constrain changes in efficiency—a value repeatedly stressed by social scientists and sympathetic analysts working in and around the energy system (Farhar, 1991; Schipper, 1991; Lovins, 1992; Lutzenhiser, 1992a; Stern, 1986,1992a). It is also clear that macro-social processes involving the geopolitics of energy, global energy system-based pollution, and the energy technology dependencies of advanced societies will grow in importance in coming decades. A few relevant sociological analyses in this area have recently appeared (e.g., Dunlap, Kraft and Rosa, 1993, Hackett and Lutzenhiser, 1991, Lutzenhiser and Hackett, 1993, Short and Clark, 1992) as have sociological contributions concerning global environmental change (e.g., see B?ttel and Taylor, 1992; Schnaiberg, 1991; Dunlap, Lutzenhiser and Rosa, 1994; and Dunlap, Gallup and Gallup, 1993). But this literature represents a very small part of a rapidly growing body of research on large-scale environmental processes and problems—many rooted in the energy system. If sociology is so relevant, why does it play such a minor part? Because the discipline has defined the analysis of the energy and environmental bases of society as marginal to the sociological enterprise, and because the perspectives and projects of the environmental sciences have effectively marginalized the social in their analyses. External Constraints: Nonsocial Models Dominate, Marginalizing Sociological Perspectives Nonsocial disciplines have historical precedence in energy analysis, having defined the field and organized large-scale, energy-environment research pro grams before sociology arrived on the scene in the 1970s. The dominance of these disciplines, and their continued containment of the social is accomplished through distinctly nonsocial paradigms and a complex of institutional supports. In this section, I review the most widely used energy-environment models, and examine the ways in which their focus upon technical, economic and environmental variables overlooks and distorts macro-social processes and micro-social behav iors.9 I discuss their limits and empirical failures, as well as efforts to bring social institutions and human agency into energy-environment analysis. This is most often accomplished via the economic and psychological models preferred by natural scientists and engineers?although such amendments have their own empirical problems. Sociological improvements to existing paradigms are also discussed, along with several multidisciplinary approaches that seem to offer avenues of cooperation between the social and technical sciences. Global Ecologies: Big Nature and Little Humans At the most macroscopic level, energy-environment analysis involves models that are earth-focussed and nature-based. They concern geological (plate tec tonic, volcanism), biological (photosynthesis, ecosystem dynamics), and climatic processes (atmosphere-ocean interactions). The fundamental focus of analysis is change in large nonhuman systems, often over long time intervals (NAS, 1990). For example, one important model of the earth system focuses on the carbo? cycle ?a phenomenon that involves the interaction of geological, biological and cli matic processes and is of considerable importance in evaluating the consequences of global warming caused by increased carbon dioxide (C02) levels in the at mosphere. Treating global carbon flow as an input-output problem, a "sources and sinks" model (NAS 1991) can be used to inventory the release of carbon into the atmosphere (primarily from natural sources) and its subsequent removal (prima rily through the natural "sequestering" of carbon in sinks such as plant and animal bodies, tropical forests and ocean plankton). Human carbon releases (from industrial combustion, power plants, forest burning, etc.) are of crucial concern, but these are generally small in comparison to the volume of the atmosphere itself and the scale of naturally occurring contributions and withdrawals.10 Human atmospheric contributions work at the margins of large natural systems?which is one of the reasons that some controversy surrounds the importance of human effects on global warming. In "sources and sinks" and other global-scale environ mental models, human action does its work by amplifying and dampening the effects of larger natural processes. And despite the natural science consensus that these "anthropogenic" sources of environmental change are of the most serious sort, the bulk of scientific interest, funding and action is in the study of natural systems. In global warming research, for example, efforts are underway to produce more sophisticated models of the natural workings of the carbon cycle?earth system simulations that will employ several generations of natural scientists and engineers and will require the development of new generations of super com Lutzenhiser 63 ?ters (Kerr, 1990). In the natural science community, there is little interest in launching investigations of the human role in the energy-environment dynamic on anywhere near that scale. Even among those environmental advocates who have been historically most concerned about human effects on the earth system (e.g., Barry Commoner, Paul Ehrlich, Lester Brown), human action is painted in broad strokes and stereotyped in concepts such as "affluence," "consumerism," "technology," and "population"?obviously important clusters of variables and ones that are familiar to sociologists (Dunlap, Lutzenhiser and Rosa, 1994), but underdeveloped and in need of considerable elaboration before they can use fully contribute to debates about environmental change. While we should applaud the calls to action in response to anthropogenic change that are now emanating from the natural science community, it is clear that the participation of the social sciences has been minimal in their deliberations. The social sciences certainly bear some of the responsibility for this situation (discussed below), but they have hardly single-handedly created the institutionalized status ordering of the sciences. A quick reading of the list of 320 "prominent signatories to the world scientists' warning to humanity" (Union of Concerned Scientists, 1993) finds only seven social scientists?five economists and two geographers. Regional Models: Bringing Machines Into Natural Systems At subglobal geographies, a clearer focus on societal factors might be expected. The pollution and resource consumption impacts of industrial production, power generation, transportation systems, and dispersed energy use are most visible, for example, at the regional (nation, province or state, bioregion, watershed) scale, where human causes of environmental change can readily be seen to derive from the operations of complex sociotechnical systems. This is a topic about which sociology should have a good deal to say. But sociological models have not been applied in the environmental analysis of regional systems, while a number of engineering-based approaches have. An intriguing "industrial me tabolism" metaphor (Ayers, 1989), for example, is promoted by the National Academy of Engineering (NAE, 1989) as a device for depicting the flows of energy and materials within ecosystems. The model also illustrates the facility with which the social can be excluded through selective focus on the technical elements of regional systems. The "industrial organism" invoked in the model turns out to be composed entirely of technical elements (hardware, energy, materials, pollutants) and its "metabolism" interacts with the environment in ways that do not explicitly involve human control or consumption. When used as a descriptive tool for material flow accounting, the model clearly does useful work (Stigliani and Anderberg, 1991)- And recent discussions of regional "indus trial ecologies" do make reference to organizational learning, institutional con straints, culture and values (Thomas Dietz, personal communication, 1993). But, to date, these discussions seem to have done little to integrate the efforts of students of technology, environment and society in the analysis of regional systems. ergy Plows: Abstract Relations and Aggregate Effects Other models of society-environment dynamics focus more narrowly on en ergy flows. Most tend to operate at large geographical (societal or regional) scales, at which production, consumption, energy losses, and pollution, are analyzed in aggregate and abstract terms. For example, those models may focus on the relative energy contributions of various fuels (coal, petroleum, natural gas), on conversion technologies (hydro, thermal and nuclear electric generation), or on consumption in various (industrial, commercial, transportation, residential) "sec tors" of the society (e.g., see U.S. Department of Energy, 1993). Here too, the social role in consumption and the social organization of energy production, are subsumed and lost in aggregate flows of energy as it passes through various phases of conversion and distribution. Some systematic efforts have been made to better account for the shape of the present system and to predict future system changes (e.g, in fuels mix, technologies and consumption levels). These are embodied in various govern ment, corporate and academic policy models that take into account prices and changing energy supplies in predicting energy use. In these models, however, social processes of technical innovation and consumption behavior are seen as determined wholly by changing energy costs?which are believed to be set rather mechanically by markets for limited fuels (Starr, 1992). All social relations in these models are macro-economic, and human actions required to maintain or change the energy system are assumed to derive from the economic motivations of individuals and firms. The more likely socioeconomic relations of modern societies (Granovetter, 1985; Etzioni, 1988, 1991) and the effects of noneconomic influences on technology development, fuel choice, and consumption patterns, are definitionally excluded from consideration. Understanding Energy Use: Focus on Hardware Variables and Human Constants Some energy analyses also focus more narrowly on trends in energy use and pollution?a side of the system that involves fairly obvious social influences on production and consumption. Complex models of changing energy demand? that specify in detail various end-uses of energy?are widely used by energy regulatory agencies and utility companies (CEC, 1991; DOE, 1990). They too manage to sharply limit consideration of the social. In their "disaggregation" of household energy consumption, for example, these models additively combine estimates of "typical" energy flows through water heaters, furnaces, refrigera tors, televisions, stoves, washers, dryers, etc., to build up a picture of the total energy demanded by "stocks" of housing. Human occupants are subsumed by the built environment, their variable social behavior being embedded in the consumption averages assigned to various types of machines and houses. The basic unit in the analysis of human-object "artifact ensembles" (Bijker, 1993) is taken to be the physical object, while human behaviors required to activate objects and induce energy flows are assumed to be homogeneous. These models make the absurdly simple assumption that all humans are alike?an assumption challenged by a number of empirical studies that suggest that energy use behavior and consumption via appliances and buildings is actually highly variable and socially structured (Lutzenhiser, 1993). To date, however, this evidence has had little effect upon the specification or use of these policy models. Highly detailed models of this sort have also been developed to study "build ing performance" (e.g., the U.S. Department of Energy's DOE2 model, developed by Lawrence Berkeley Laboratory). These models provide micro-physical simula tions of the interactions of single buildings and their environments. Here too, human occupants have a ghostly status, being embedded in average appliance consumption estimates and perhaps, in a very detailed modelling, contributing heat to the system from metabolism and their use of small appliances and lighting. Humans are only physical objects in these micro-modelling efforts, although, to the extent possible, actors and action are banned from both simulated and ex perimental research on "building" energy use. Having eliminated social action, these models, despite their physical detail, do not fare well in empirical tests (Vine, et al., 1982).11 In forecasting the future, both housing stock and building-based models use engineering assumptions about likely changes in technology, along with esti mates of population growth and future energy prices, to estimate the changing energy use patterns from which further estimates of pollution and environmental impacts may be derived. Such models are widely used as guides for policy and regulation. The only social science influence in these efforts is from neoclassical economics; for example, in assumptions that choices to produce more efficient technologies or buildings and the decisions of consumers to purchase them are determined by self-interested economic calculation. Limited Efforts to Bring People Back In If energy flows were determined exclusively by weather, buildings and ma chines, and if societal-level energy and environmental impacts could be accurately predicted in aggregate terms, then sociologists would have little quarrel with these models. We might like them to be more fully specified, since human groups, after all, control hardware, respond to the weather, and take action in the face of price changes. But more than disciplinary turf or theoretical symmetry is at stake. Not only do these models not perform well empirically, but there is substantial evidence that their errors can be traced directly to their failure to consider human behavior. Although social action has been paradigmatically excluded from energy analy sis except at the margins, a good deal of social science has been done at those margins?and the literature is fairly accessible to energy analysts. For example, studies of energy-using behavior and of empirical variations in energy use, as well as thoughtful critiques of the "energy user as rational economic actor" formulation, have been offered.12 Social psychologists and cognitive anthro pologists have been the strongest critics of economism and rationalism in this literature?arguing that actors' understandings (of energy, technology and available choice) differ considerably from engineering understandings of these matters, and that lay economic calculations are not, in reality, made as assumed by economists (Kempton and Montgomery, 1982; Kempton and Layne, 1988; Archer, et al., 1984; Stern, 1986). Alternative attitudes based psychological models (e.g., of consumer willing ness to make energy conserving changes in behavior and technology) have not performed well, however, with attitudes proving to be weak predictors of en ergy action (Olsen, 1981; Ester, 1985). Attempts to amend attitude models by considering "context factors" (e.g., price, weather and available technology? the stuff of physical models) have been more successful (Black, Stern and Elworth, 1985), leading to a call for the fundamental revision of psychological models to incorporate a wider range of social and physical context variables (Stern and Oskamp, 1987). An important weakness in this work lies in the fact that, as in economic formulations, the individual actor (albeit under the influence of social others) is the basic unit of analysis. While a focus on the individual has provided insights into choice, values and commitments as these bear on consumption and ulti mately upon environmental pollution, it also obscures the actions of social groups? families, households, kin networks, neighborhoods, communities, organizations, and cultures?and their consumption and conservation of energy. A focus on groups is not simply a plea for more sociologically oriented analysis. It also represents a call for a more human-ecological focus, following from the observations that social groups construct and occupy buildings, that economic choice and technology use are socially constrained and culturally accomplished and that collectively constructed lifestyles are fundamental in the patterning of consumption. Sociological work undertaken from this perspective has shown clear associations between social structure, energy use and pollution (Dillman, Rosa and Dillman, 1983; Lutzenhiser and Hackett, 1993). There are some indications of convergence between physical-technical, eco nomic, psychological and sociocultural models?since all offer selective but useful views of the ecology of energy-environment systems. A few efforts have been made, for example, to design and test mixed models (Cramer, 1985; Parti, Sebald and Won, 1986; Lutzenhiser and Hackett, 1993). But physical/economic models clearly predominate and their partisans show few signs of publicly acknowledg ing their weaknesses or expanding the range of variables taken into account (Lutzenhiser, 1992b). Calls for rapproachment have come from sociologists working within the energy research and policy establishment (Farhar, 1991) and efforts to bring social science theory and research to bear on large-scale environmental problems have proposed that energy studies be used as a model for other in terdisciplinary collaborations (Stern, 1992b). But to date these have had little discernible effect. Accommodation in Environmental Analysis: Human "Driving Forces" A well-supported "second environmental science" could indeed promote needed interdisciplinary and cross-paradigmatic research. But even so, it might lack the theoretical coherence desirable in a science of society-environment relations. One such theoretical orientation has been proposed by the National Academy of Sciences/National Research Council panel on the Human Dimensions of Global Environmental Change (NAS, 1992)?itself an interdisciplinary group. The panel was charged with inventorying knowledge of human-environment interactions and, although it reviewed a wide range of scholarship in environmental sociol ogy, only one sociologist served as a panel member. Rather than explicitly adopting a human-ecological or environmental sociological framework, the panel opted to classify human causes of environmental change in five broad categories of "driv ing forces," calling for studies of their collective environmental effects.13 These "forces" (". . . a complex of social, political, economic, technological and cul tural variables. . ." [NAS, 1992, p. 75]) include: population change, economic growth, technological change, political-economic institutions, and attitudes and beliefs. One can hardly dispute the relevance of any item on the list, but in combining dissimilar elements (i.e., psychological states, population trends and social institutions) the model seems more a loosely coupled collection of per spectives than a theoretical synthesis. This is hardly a fatal flaw in what is fundamentally a research agenda (in the construction of which the panel showed considerable breadth of vision). This sort of compromise theorizing is probably inevitable when "... attempting to convince social scientists why energy and environment are important and bio logical and physical scientists why social science has something to say" (Thomas Dietz, personal communication, 1993); and, it must be said that the driving forces model is fairly congenial with socioecological perspectives (Dunlap, Lutzenhiser and Rosa, 1994). But it should concern sociologists who are inter ested in a theoretical integration of the social, technical and ecological that the model awkwardly couples disembodied sociopolitical institutions and neoclassi cal economic markets with consumers (as psychological individuals), whose nature is rather uncritically taken to be pan-culturally acquisitive. Toward a Sociological Model A more fully social account would, for example, point to the fact that energy technology-environment systems may have more coherence than the driving forces model implies?being socially structured at the macro level and cultur ally generated at the micro level. The relative importance of micro and macro processes and their interrelations in the ecology of industrial societies are not well understood, and represent important areas for research?e.g., concerning the degree to which "demand" can possibly be autonomous of supply (Schnaiberg, 1991). Production priorities and their environmental impacts are certainly shaped by political economy, while consumption is importantly constituted in moral (cultural) action. A more sociological research program would frame the human dimensions of environmental change as a problem involving, for example, the behavior of organizational systems (fields, sets, networks, industries), and their interactions with class, race, gender, and consumption cultures. This approach would yield a critical whole-system model, while more limited physical, economic and psychological models of human-energy-environment systems take on a narrow focus and consensual tone that necessarily embody system maintenance interests. Competition and conflict are treated as exogenous in conventional models because they are not designed for human-environment system analysis, but are intended more to be used by competing social interests to generate particular images of the world in order to secute particular outcomes. The broader socialanalytic frame takes these models and their modellers, along with the social/ political relations in which they are embedded, as themselves integral elements of the sociotechnical systems implicated in environmental change. Institutional Context: The Energy Establishment and Limitations of Academic Sociology The Power and Insularity of the Energy System The institutional milieu that supports narrow and asocial definitions of the energy-environment problem is one dominated by large energy firms, an elaborate regulatory complex, and a highly scientized policy process. This is particularly true in the case of costly and hazardous energy technologies (e.g., nuclear fis sion, fusion, and radioactive waste disposal). The energy system is interwoven with a dense web of regulations, laws, engineering standards, and bureaucratic procedures, all of which are encoded in the same physical and economistic terms used in energy research. Taken together, they embody a paradigm concretized in technical language and legal instruments with strong inertial qualities. The paradigm derives from specialized academic disciplines, which are closely related to the energy system. These include energy economics, electrical, chemical, mechanical, civil, and environmental engineering, systems analysis and operations research. A network of corporate and university-based national laboratories conduct federally sponsored research guided by the physical-economic paradigm, and a number of specialized energy associations and energy-related branches of scientific societies regularly hold professional meetings, publish journals, and sponsor special conferences that support the paradigm. Some of these groups are even empowered to set formal standards for engineering and architectural designs. A wide array of consulting firms, specializing in paradigm-supporting training and evaluation, also operate in the orbits of energy firms, state agencies and the national laboratories. Social scientists hold a tiny fraction of the professional positions in the energy system, and their influence is sharply circumscribed. The sociological study of the energy system's self-understandings, paradigmatic limitations, environmental constructions, and difficulties in communicating across system boundaries offer numerous opportunities to extend sociologial theories of organizational change and the evolution of large-scale social sys tems – e.g., along the lines indicated by Stinchcombe (1990) and Luhmann (1989). It is also an area rich in possibilities for the newly expanding sociologies of technology, innovation and technical occupations. For example, studies of the evolution of the system as it faces serious environmental problems related to nuclear power and radioactive waste, fossil fuel depletion, alternative energy sources, and energy-efficiency can contribute insights to a number of areas of environmental sociology. In fact, the relative lack of sociological work in the area would also seem to make actors in the energy system potentially important consumers of social science research. The Disciplinary Limitations of Sociology But the energy system has been far from solicitous of sociological views, and sociology has been surprisingly reticent about energy studies. A call to arms by one of the discipline's most influential observers—Duncan (1978) in "Sociologists Should Reconsider Nuclear Energy"—was virtually ignored. While sociologists enjoyed funding and produced a number of useful energy studies at the height of the energy crisis, they shifted their attention elsewhere as energy prices fell. Opportunism? Not entirely. These researchers often fondly recall the interdisciplinary projects in which they were involved. Factors internal to the discipline played a significant role in this shift, including the low status of interdisciplinary publication, and the loss of legitimacy that followed from loss of funding. The disciplinary costs of pursuing interdisciplinary interests continue to be high. A steep learning curve is involved in such work, since at least some technical knowledge must be acquired for even modest studies of energy-environment systems. As an illustration, the social historian Thomas Hughes (1983), for example, found that without an understanding of the importance of "load factor" (a measure of system utilization) among early electrical system builders, he could not adequately account for the particular ways in which late, nineteenth-century electrical utilities engineered their expansions. Whether the object of inquiry might be the macro-political economy of nuclear power plant siting, or the micro-social relations of engineering design groups, a time-consuming mastery of technical vocabularies is required. Gaining the necessary scientific and technical background is hardly an insurmountable task (science writers do it, more and less well, all the time). But even so, a significant investment in an unfamiliar field is required, since this knowledge is rarely gained incidentally by sociologists. Our formal associations and informal orbits on campus tend to be segregated from those of natural scientists and engineers, and few efforts are generally made on either side to exchange views. Economists seem more willing to acquire at least a first approximation of other discipline's theories and then search for ways to bring economic models to bear on the problems that they find there. This segregation is mirrored in the directorate structure of the National Science Foundation, the division of labor among private foundations, and the organizational makeup of multidisciplinary scientific associations. As a result, institutions with social science capabilities are generally disconnected from those with environmental responsibility (NAS, 1992). The unwillingness to venture into unfamiliar territory is strong even when boundary-spanning projects are undertaken. For example, efforts to stimulate interdisciplinary socioenvironmental research through NSF's Human Dimensions of Global Change (HDGC) program—a three year-old initiative whose funding is equal to that of the entire NSF sociology program—have been met with little interest from sociology. Just as natural science approaches tend to exclude human behavior, so too do sociological perspectives tend to exclude the physical and environmental from their accounts of social change. Contemporary sociologists concerned with environment and technology continue a long struggle with an intellectual division of labor that has narrowly circumscribed the theoretical domain of the social. As Catton and Dunlap (1980) point out, the problem derives from efforts to carve out a unique subject matter for sociology?—a process that has resulted in core conceptions that miscast social action as somehow disconnected from the physical and natural systems within which action is necessarily embedded, and toward which action routinely refers. And just as traditional sociological self-understandings are uneasy with "technical" and "biological" topics, we can now add emergent interpretivist perspectives that see natural environments largely as social-constructions—nature as a potentially important social variable risks becoming mere nature as socially variable.14 The general lack of familiarity with the sociological relevance of energy-environment research is clearly reflected in disciplinary publication patterns. While opportunities to publish energy-related research in sociology journals certainly exist, they are finite and limited by both real and perceived audiences for the work. As a result, only a small number of energy-related papers have appeared in the sociological literature during the past 20 years, with very few in first-tier journals. Publishing opportunities in refereed energy and environmental journals are somewhat more numerous—and, in fact, work reported there is more likely to influence research and policy in those fields than are papers published in sociology journals. Publications in energy and environmental literatures are difficult for sociologists to access and evaluate, however, and tendencies toward parochialism can result in a devaluation of work published outside of sociology. As a practical matter, the active engagement of sociologists within environmental and technical domains is—perhaps unintendedly—discouraged, and one concrete result is that the generation of sociologists who pioneered sociological energy studies is rapidly thinning. The failure to sustain a critical mass of energy sociologists is due partly to historical coincidence. As the energy crisis disappeared from center stage and the turn to market forces was made, funding for research groups declined and the opportunity for academic influence in the energy system passed. The discipline still had a contribution to make, but sociologists concerned about tenure and promotion did not persist since, in the words of one informant "... it was clear that the discipline wasn't interested and we needed to worry about review." Those who were able to find positions within the energy system have, over time, had some influence on policy. But it is little wonder that graduate students who might otherwise be interested in the area recognize the stigma associated with anything that can be cast as "applied" research, and steer a prudent course away from interdisciplinary specialities. The result is a sharply limited lack of sociological human resources that might be deployed in energy-environment studies—despite the expressed needs and desires of concerned natural scientists and environmental advocates. Although the market may be changing in modest ways, few sociology departments have actively recruited faculty in the areas of environment and technology. Few Ph.D. programs have offered training in these areas, and only a handful of land-grant institutions have developed strong research and teaching programs in environmental sociology. The NAS panel on the Human Dimensions of Environmental Change considered in some detail these and other institutional limitations to basic research on human-environment interactions. They concluded that existing disciplinary reward structures were unlikely to support the needed expansion of environmental social science training and research, and recommended that special efforts be made by the NSF and other federal science agencies to target fellowships and research funding in support of the effort (NAS, 1992, pp. 223-234). Disciplinary Agendas in Research, Training and Institution Building The promotion of such policies and the use of their benefits, to an important degree, depends upon the initiative of the discipline. If it is desirable to more aggressively cultivate sociological studies of energy and the environment—and I think that it clearly is for both theoretical and societal reasons—then it is necessary to open up otherwise closed environmental, technical and social paradigms to better secure legitimacy in all quarters for this sort of work. Simply negotiating access for sociologists to multidisciplinary teams offers no guarantee of legitimacy, however, either with the collaborators or with mainstream sociology. Social perspectives are regularly accorded only token status in multi disciplinary projects—a good example might be international development work. Multidisciplinary funding programs often limit the social sciences to small "high risk" projects, and social science graduate students are often disadvantaged in fellowships with applicants from the natural sciences and economics.

#### **Forcing specific policy analysis is key – allows state institutions to be reclaimed and generates debater education necessary to create a left governmentality – necessary to create a public sphere**

Ferguson, Professor of Anthropology at Stanford, 11

(The Uses of Neoliberalism, Antipode, Vol. 41, No. S1, pp 166–184)

If we are seeking, as this special issue of Antipode aspires to do, to link our critical analyses to the world of grounded political struggle—not only to interpret the world in various ways, but also to change it—then there is much to be said for focusing, as I have here, on mundane, real- world debates around policy and politics, even if doing so inevitably puts us on the compromised and reformist terrain of the possible, rather than the seductive high ground of revolutionary ideals and utopian desires. But I would also insist that there is more at stake in the examples I have discussed here than simply a slightly better way to ameliorate the miseries of the chronically poor, or a technically superior method for relieving the suffering of famine victims.¶ My point in discussing the South African BIG campaign, for instance, is not really to argue for its implementation. There is much in the campaign that is appealing, to be sure. But one can just as easily identify a series of worries that would bring the whole proposal into doubt. Does not, for instance, the decoupling of the question of assistance from the issue of labor, and the associated valorization of the “informal”, help provide a kind of alibi for the failures of the South African regime to pursue policies that would do more to create jobs? Would not the creation of a basic income benefit tied to national citizenship simply exacerbate the vicious xenophobia that already divides the South African poor,¶ in a context where many of the poorest are not citizens, and would thus not be eligible for the BIG? Perhaps even more fundamentally, is the idea of basic income really capable of commanding the mass support that alone could make it a central pillar of a new approach to distribution? The record to date gives powerful reasons to doubt it. So far, the technocrats’ dreams of relieving poverty through efficient cash transfers have attracted little support from actual poor people, who seem to find that vision a bit pale and washed out, compared with the vivid (if vague) populist promises of jobs and personalistic social inclusion long offered by the ANC patronage machine, and lately personified by Jacob Zuma (Ferguson forthcoming).¶ My real interest in the policy proposals discussed here, in fact, has little to do with the narrow policy questions to which they seek to provide answers. For what is most significant, for my purposes, is not whether or not these are good policies, but the way that they illustrate a process through which specific governmental devices and modes of reasoning that we have become used to associating with a very particular (and conservative) political agenda (“neoliberalism”) may be in the process of being peeled away from that agenda, and put to very different uses. Any progressive who takes seriously the challenge I pointed to at the start of this essay, the challenge of developing new progressive arts of government, ought to find this turn of events of considerable interest.¶ As Steven Collier (2005) has recently pointed out, it is important to question the assumption that there is, or must be, a neat or automatic fit between a hegemonic “neoliberal” political-economic project (however that might be characterized), on the one hand, and specific “neoliberal” techniques, on the other. Close attention to particular techniques (such as the use of quantitative calculation, free choice, and price driven by supply and demand) in particular settings (in Collier’s case, fiscal and budgetary reform in post-Soviet Russia) shows that the relationship between the technical and the political-economic “is much more polymorphous and unstable than is assumed in much critical geographical work”, and that neoliberal technical mechanisms are in fact “deployed in relation to diverse political projects and social norms” (2005:2).¶ As I suggested in referencing the role of statistics and techniques for pooling risk in the creation of social democratic welfare states, social technologies need not have any essential or eternal loyalty to the political formations within which they were first developed. Insurance rationality at the end of the nineteenth century had no essential vocation to provide security and solidarity to the working class; it was turned to that purpose (in some substantial measure) because it was available, in the right place at the right time, to be appropriated for that use. Specific ways of solving or posing governmental problems, specific institutional and intellectual mechanisms, can be combined in an almost infinite variety of ways, to accomplish different social ends. With social, as with any other sort of technology, it is not the machines or the mechanisms that decide what they will be used to do.¶ Foucault (2008:94) concluded his discussion of socialist government- ality by insisting that the answers to the Left’s governmental problems require not yet another search through our sacred texts, but a process of conceptual and institutional innovation. “[I]f there is a really socialist governmentality, then it is not hidden within socialism and its texts. It cannot be deduced from them. It must be invented”. But invention in the domain of governmental technique is rarely something worked up out of whole cloth. More often, it involves a kind of bricolage (Le ́vi- Strauss 1966), a piecing together of something new out of scavenged parts originally intended for some other purpose. As we pursue such a process of improvisatory invention, we might begin by making an inventory of the parts available for such tinkering, keeping all the while an open mind about how different mechanisms might be put to work, and what kinds of purposes they might serve. If we can go beyond seeing in “neoliberalism” an evil essence or an automatic unity, and instead learn to see a field of specific governmental techniques, we may be surprised to find that some of them can be repurposed, and put to work in the service of political projects very different from those usually associated with that word. If so, we may find that the cabinet of governmental arts available to us is a bit less bare than first appeared, and that some rather useful little mechanisms may be nearer to hand than we thought.

#### Public sphere key to solve extinction – multiple structural trends

Boggs ’97

(CARL BOGGS – Professor and Ph.D. Political Science, National University, Los Angeles -- Theory and Society 26: 741-780)

The false sense of empowerment that comes with such mesmerizing impulses is accompanied by a loss of public engagement, an erosion of citizenship and a depleted capacity of individuals in large groups to work for social change. As this ideological quagmire worsens, urgent problems that are destroying the fabric of American society will go unsolved -- perhaps even unrecognized -- only to fester more ominously into the future. And such problems (ecological crisis, poverty, urban decay, spread of infectious cannot be understood outside the larger social and global context diseases, technological displacement of workers) of internationalized markets, finance, and communications. Paradoxically, the widespread retreat from politics, often inspired by localist sentiment, comes at a time when agendas that ignore or side-step these global realities will, more than ever, be reduced to impotence. In his commentary on the state of citizenship today, Wolin refers to the increasing sublimation and dilution of politics, as larger numbers of people turn away from public concerns toward private ones. By diluting the life of common involvements, we negate the very idea of politics as a source of public ideals and visions.74 In the meantime, the fate of the world hangs in the balance. The unyielding truth is that, even as the ethos of anti-politics becomes more compelling and even fashionable in the United States, it is the vagaries of political power that will continue to decide the fate of human societies. This last point demands further elaboration. The shrinkage of politics hardly means that corporate colonization will be less of a reality, that social hierarchies will somehow disappear, or that gigantic state and military structures will lose their hold over people's lives. Far from it: the space abdicated by a broad citizenry, well-informed and ready to participate at many levels, can in fact be filled by authoritarian and reactionary elites -- an already familiar dynamic in many lesser- developed countries. The fragmentation and chaos of a Hobbesian world, not very far removed from the rampant individualism, social Darwinism, and civic violence that have been so much a part of the American landscape, could be the prelude to a powerful Leviathan designed to impose order in the face of disunity and atomized retreat. In this way the eclipse of politics might set the stage for a reassertion of politics in more virulent guise -- or it might help further rationalize the existing power structure. In either case, the state would likely become what Hobbes anticipated: the embodiment of those universal, collec- tive interests that had vanished from civil society.75

### 2AC Anthro Kritik

#### Case outweighs –

#### Cross apply f/w from the other K

#### Alt fails – they can’t convince people to not be ethnocentric

Lee, Philosophy Professor at Bloomsburg, ‘9 (Wendy, Spring, “Restoring Human-Centerednes to Environmental Conscience: The Ecocentrist's Dilemma, the Role of Heterosexualized Anthropomorphizing, and the Significance of Language to Ecological Feminism” Ethics and the Environment, Vol 14 No 1, Project Muse)

Bender undertakes this task in the course of promoting his specific version of ecocen trism that he calls "nondualism" but it is telling that, instead of offering an argument that provides grounds for rejecting the "dualism" of experiencing subject and experienced object, he resorts to an experience of "nonduality": I start out…in ordinary, dualistic, waking consciousness, feeling myself a subject amidst myriad objects around me, each experienced as other. I discover I do not exist independently, but am like a node in a web, through which diverse kinds of energy flow. For example, I [End Page 35] take in the Sun's warmth, the in-breath, food, water, human speech, and so on. Meanwhile, I expel many kinds of energy. Like the out-breath, speech, bodily movements, and excreta. The energy I take in and expel circulates everywhere on Earth, passing through others as through myself. Thus I discover my connectedness to all other beings, such that I, like they, am but one manifestation of this energy flow, of planet Earth…. Nonduality emerges as I realize further that natural phenomena are Earth transiently manifest, empty of substantive selfhood (objectivity), since everything is dependently co-originated. Thus, though I am precisely emptiness of substantive or independent selfhood; even so, as one particular manifold of relations, I am unique. (2003, 435) The difficulties here are three-fold: First, this isn't an argument, but rather an experiential narrative, hence it would be folly to think it could establish anything other than that someone can have such an experience. But since such could be motivated by, say, exhaustion, illness, or the use of narcotics, it hardly establishes any metaphysical claim about the nature of identity or being—much less about any capacity to dissociate oneself from "substantive selfhood." Second, however much he may feel himself to be "empty of substantive selfhood" Bender's use of "I' suggests that he confuses the capacity to conceive with the capacity to actually be so emptied. It's one thing to conceive of myself as connected to all other beings—indeed I do so conceive myself, I know this in the abstract to be true and I know of no evidence that contradicts it. It is, however, quite another thing to experience myself as emptied of selfhood. Moreover, it is simply false that what I can conceive, imagine, think, or even describe is necessarily something I can experience per se. Third, although Bender's appeals to intuition, mystical insight, Spinoza's notion of particulars as manifestations of nature (2003, 434–5), or Buddhist inspired meditation (2003, 436–7) might be compelling for someone already convinced that so-called nondualist identification with nonhuman nature is possible, these hardly suffice as an argument convincing to the skeptic who may not share the necessary presuppositions or traditions. Here too, then, Bender's account is unconvincing—the ethical norm he derives from it (among others), "Form one body with all beings!" is likely to be mystifying to anyone unconvinced we can make this leap of faith from centeredness to "one body" or (as the moral dictum requires) from the "I" of subject-object dualism to the disavowal of my body. [End Page 36] Moreover, if I am right that there are good reasons to take the specifically embodied configuration of capacities and limitations that describe human being seriously, no such dissociation from "I" is possible—in fact, it intimates precisely the dualism Bender rejects. However deep my feelings (spiritual sensibilities, affectionate sentiments, desires to connect) go with respect to my appreciation of natural objects and phenomena, I nonetheless remain at the center of my embodied consciousness—and cannot be/do otherwise. Hence, one more version of the ecocentrist's dilemma: the dissociation of self demanded by the moral maxim "form one body with all things" assumes that I can dissociate my consciousness from my body—what else to call this but dualism? The notion that I could dissociate myself without dissociating myself from my situated body to be "one with all things" is comprehensible only if I am not (at least essentially) my body, but rather a consciousness that, even if not fully independent, is capable of not merely conceiving but experiencing "my" body as something other than bound by my own skin, that is, as not my body. Hence I must be dual—a "mind" that, in virtue of its capacity to empty itself of its "substantive selfhood," is merely in a dissociable body. No doubt, Bender would find this objection to his view onerous. However, when he advises us to try to expand our selves through, for example, meditation or to encompass an ever-wider set of relations with and to human and nonhuman others (2003, 423–4), it is hard to see how his view does not fit the dualist shoe. He writes that "[s]uch a practice, over time, should transform your sense of who you are as you discover you are not the separate skin-encapsulated individual you once thought you were, but that you belong to all other living beings, and that other beings are not really other, and that you yourself are not really the center of concern." (2003, 424, my emphasis) Again, Bender confuses what I can conceive with what I can experience—I can conceive myself as "not the center of concern," but not an iota of this moral recognition either requires or makes possible an experience of myself as anything other than "skin encapsulated." Bender hasn't, moreover, the luxury of trading in his metaphysical commitments for the option that he's speaking "merely" phenomenologically or metaphorically. For neither the environmental pragmatist, who would likely deny the need to undertake such a practice in order to have a stake in the future of human [End Page 37] consciousness, nor those who engage in such practices without a smidgeon of the environmental activism Bender hopes will follow, are likely to be moved by anything but an argument for nondualism—and this Bender does not provide.

#### The critique reifies anthropocentricism

#### Places human consciousness on an ontological pedestal by treating ALL objects in the world as if they must possess this feature

#### Solidifies the human/nature divide by treating humans as uniquely responsible for “observing” the cosmos while other entities can act.

Harman, 2005 (Graham, critically acclaimed Heidegger scholar who spent 10 years reading everything Heidegger wrote [even in German,] Associate Provost for Research Administration at the American University of Cairo, “Guerrilla Metaphysics: Phenomenology and the Carpentry of Things,” p. 241-245)

The theme of representation is one of the recurrent problems of philosophy. Certain special entities known as sentient organisms are granted a unique ability to perceive images of the world, rather than merely responding to it with blind causal force as subsentient entities are supposed to do. The hermeneutic school ofHeidegger and his successors claims to have left the problem of representation in the past. For hermeneutics there is supposedly no magical gap between humans and the world, since humans are always already involved with objects, and hence there is no pure representation of the world free of the prior interpretation and use of objects. In one sense this is a clear step forward, but in another it yields no progress at all. For with the notion that human beings are rooted in a specific factical life rather than standing at a distance from the world and observing bloodless images of it, we do come one step closer to dethroning the privilege of human beings in philosophy. Yet hermeneutics still ascribes to humans (and perhaps even to animals) an apparently miraculous power: the ability to convert the sheer impact of the world into pictures or simulacra of such impact. Humans still transcend the world and contemplate it, even if only partially, and this makes humans different in kind from mere paper, sand, or gold. It is still humans alone who can perceive the world, and the philosophical gap between sentient and inanimate or object and appearance is still taken as a given. This in itself would not be so bad, since most of us would willingly concede important differences in the structure of conscious and unconscious objects. But the question is whether the gap between conscious and unconscious entities is so unspeakably vast that it needs to be built into the very foundation of ontology in a way that the chasms between mammal and reptile or plant and fungus never are. For hermeneutics, there is still an absolute gulf between two types of entities, with humans and possibly animals on one side and all remaining objects on the other. A crucial ontological structure-the as-structure-is ascribed to certain entities and denied to others. But this means that Heidegger grounds his ontology in an ontic rift between specific types of objects. And in fact, he has no hope of explaining how the as-structure magically arises only for certain objects and not others. Nor does he ever attempt such an explanation. I have suggested that the real stakes in ontology lie at a far more primitive level than any of the well-known special properties of human being. The as-structure is found even in inanimate matter; the dual axes of the world are everywhere and not just in some anxious, mournful human space that would exclude such supposed inferiors as almonds and glass. One possible antidote to this bias would be to embrace panpsychism and claim that even rocks and milkweed must already show crude traces of cognitive power. Such doctrines are now wildly out of fashion, and are generally exiled to the wastelands and gullies of the philosophical world, the eternal homeland of renegades, outliers, pariahs, hermits, vagabonds, and unemployable cranks. It would take a short memory to think that such theories will remain unfashionable forever: most abandoned concepts return someday in modified form, as the crop rotation of history brings every fallow field back to life sooner or later. Yet reviving panpsychism would not solve our current problem, since this refreshingly freewheeling theory actually preserves the central problem of human-centered philosophy: namely, it still assumes that cognition is something so poignantly special that ontology cannot live without it. After all, no one ever claims that inanimate matter must possess other human features in germinal form, such as five-fingered hands, a spinal cord, taste buds, laughter, or musical skill. I have yet to hear anyone speculate that rocks and maple sap display a primitive form of language. In this respect, even philosophical cranks have proven themselves to have limited imaginations. For some reason it is sentient perception alone that is deemed so important that certain fringe schools allow it to balloon into an ontological feature of objects as a whole. And this merely displays the well-worn assumption that there is something magically unique and inexplicable about the ability to create images of things rather than merely submitting to their blows. When hunters and gatherers came to develop agriculture, few historians deny that this change is of staggering importance for human history. This shift is much more than a difference of degree: it is a revolution that triggers the unforeseen rise of cities, armies, monarchies, and bureaucratic specialists. Even so, no one tries to convert agricultural life into some sort of magic ontological principle; no philosopher carves up reality into entities that farm and entities that do not. When birds first developed wings at some point in their evolutionary history, this was a crucial shift that opened a new reality and new lifestyle to these creatures, inviting them for the first time to long-distance migration and the building of nests in trees. Despite this landmark step in the history of animals, no philosopher sees the gap between winged and nonwinged creatures as immeasurably vast. No school of "panpterists􀈐' steps forth to claim that even dirt and sunlight must have wings in some imperceptible, germinal form. Heidegger makes an important mistake by locating one of his pivotal ontological features (the as-structure) in certain kinds of objects at the expense of others. For him, only one kind of entity transcends, nihilates, or rises above the world to see it "as" what it is, and that entity is human Dasein. To use a term that Heidegger himself avoids, only one kind of entity is conscious, and for this reason the very existence of human beings is supposed to introduce a vital cleft into being itself. This is not only a typical case of human arrogance in philosophy, but also has an air of voodoo or fetish about it-like some tribal myth in which the world was a lifeless soil until sprinkled with talking magic beans. We will never overcome this voodoo ontology by joining forces with the panpsychists and demanding that the special powers of human consciousness also be divvied up among dust, cactus, water, and melons. Instead, we overcome it only by denying that the special features of human consciousness are built into the heart of ontology at all. The history of the universe is packed with numerous fateful revolutions: the emergence of the heavier elements from hydrogen; the birth of solar systems; the breakup of Pangaea into multiple continents; the emergence of muticellular life, the beaks of birds, and the gills of fish; the first dreams in early animals; the domestication of cows and dogs; the shift from papyrus to paper; navigation across open sea rather than playing it safe along the coasts; electricity and telephones; phenomenology, quantum theory, and psychoanalysis; the atomic bomb, smart weapons, credit cards, steam engines, atonal music, internal combustion, and blood transfusions. My claim is that sentient consciousness, human theory, and language all belong on the same list with these other examples, and not on some sanctified ontological throne from which they might proclaim that conscious images of the world are infinitely different from the inanimate causal impacts of that world. There is no absolute gap between objects and images, but only ubiquitous gaps between one object and the next. Images are merely sensual objects, and sensual objects lie always and only on the interior of real ones.

#### C. The aff solves – humans are different in degree, but not kind – recognizing our differences from other forms of life is critical to an appreciation of the cosmos – the active engagement of the 1AC is the most productive way to solve the K, the neg’s cynicism merely reifies our role as ivory tower observers, who must be disengaged unlike other entities

Harman, 2005 (Graham, critically acclaimed Heidegger scholar who spent 10 years reading everything Heidegger wrote [even in German,] Associate Provost for Research Administration at the American University of Cairo, “Guerrilla Metaphysics: Phenomenology and the Carpentry of Things,” p. 238-241)

What must be rejected from the start is the prevailing model of humans as transcending or negating the world, as critics who break loose from animal bondage and stand in a windy, starry space of freedom. We should be equally suspicious of those hermeneutic versions of critique that merely add the caveat that perfect transcendence is impossible. For even when this proviso is added, it is still a question of trying to rise above what is taken for granted and seeing it "as" what it is. Both models support the peda­ gogically influential idea that philosophy is a kind of critical thinking less attached to the world than other modes of dealing with objects, a style of cognition opposed to the gullibility of the unreflective. Some people put this model of philosophy to work by mocking the triviality of "ontic" acts, dismissing major political and scientific events as beneath their attention, perhaps even forbidding their children to read newspapers due to the merely superficial, ontic character of journalism. Others enact critical thinking by challenging their peers to endless oral disputes, assertively poking holes in each other's argumentation, competing to free themselves ever more decisively than their rivals from all naive presupposition-the sort of pushy, clambering atmosphere that would have crushed such melancholic loners as Plato and Spinoza. Indeed, there are many who think that philosophy amounts to nothing more than this: the ability to knock down all comers. In one sense, critical thinking deserves praise for acting as a cor­ rosive fluid on dogmatic tradition, and our educational institutions must encourage this skill at the introductory level. But at a later stage it easily becomes counterproductive, for there is a sense in which the great thinkers are always far more childlike and gullible, far more involved with some mesmerizing central idea than all of the wary, uncommitted, replaceable critics. For contrary to popular belief, it is not philosophers, but only ironists, transgressors, blase hipsters, lizards, and cows who remain relatively free of fascination with the world around them and reduce to dust whatever they might criticize or even eat, converting all objects into terms com­ mensurate with themselves. To be a critic is to eat the world, leaving no seed left over to blossom in the spring. This is not to say that only philosophers are able to avoid this tempta­ tion, since it is not a lower form of human who devotes herself to chem­ istry, opera, sports leagues, epic poems, fashion shows, or petroleum commodities. What distinguishes humans from animals is not some sort of critical distance from our surroundings, but rather an expansive fascination with all domestic and exotic things; no animal knows the gullible attach­ ment to things that humans enact in the practice of religion or the labor of designing a submarine. We are not more critical than animals, but more object-oriented, filling our minds with all present and absent objects, all geographical and astronomical places, all species of animal, all flavors of juice, all players from the history of baseball, all living and dead languages. We do not remain in the holistic prisons of our own lives where things are fully unified by their significance for us, but face outward toward a cosmos speckled with independent campfires and black holes, packed full with objects that generate their own private laws and both welcome and resist our attempts to gain information. We even devote endless fascination to objects that turn out not to exist-empty fears, phantoms, rickety theories, cartoon characters, false friends, glacial highland monsters. No animal is ever duped or hypnotized as deeply as we ourselves can be. If we are critics and analysts, then we analyze only in order to gullibilize ourselves still further, inserting ourselves into worthier forms of naivete than before. As we develop we become more innocent and more fascinated, not less so. This may be the ultimate lesson of the famous three metamorphoses of Nietzsche's Zarathustra. The distinction between critique and fascination is no mere toying with words, but suggests a very different style of philosophy from the more popular model of critical/analytical thought-a kind of constructive thinking. While it is certainly better to train students to pick apart flaws in argu­ ments than to leave them as easy prey for sophistry and propaganda, these are not the only two options, and both are too easy to improve us as thinkers. What we really need are not more critical readers, but more vulnerable ones, readers so hungry for the unexpected that they can "recognize a good [idea] when they see [it], 21 to paraphrase William James's view of the essence of higher education. But this implies the rare ability to become dissatisfied with the dominant trench warfare of one's own age. For this reason, when asked by friends to define philosophy, I have taken to saying that philosophy means to find ideas that bore us and invent ways to make them obsolete. But this is difficult, and requires as much scrupu­ lous respect for reality as the construction of bridges and power plants whose failure would result in the deaths of thousands. It cannot be allowed to degenerate into a kind of ultra-hip mannerism.22 There is now available a useful English edition of the early reviews of Kant's Critique ofPure Reason, which are shocking in their ability to miss the point. Reading these reviews we discover numerous reasonable criti­ cisms of Kant that persist to this day, and even a number of discerning compliments. Yet none of the first reviewers is able to recognize the revo­ lutionary kernel in Kant's now idolized book. There is plenty of "critical thinking" at work in these reviews; the authors are not fools. Their chief deficiency is subtler than this-they simply overlook the surprising treasure that lies before them, and enlist Kant's book into the existing leaden-paced trench warfare between well-known opponents that dominated their era as it does every era. Put differently: the reviewers had too little capacity for surprise, a capacity that Paul Berman has recently identified with wisdom itself. 23 Wisdom means the ability to be surprised because only this ability shows sufficient integrity to listen to the voice of the world instead of our own prejudice about the world, a goal that eludes even the wisest of humans a good deal of the time. While the critical intellect surveys the land from its lofty tower, punishing gaffes and discrepancies wherever it finds them, only inventive thinking is able to be surprised, because only such thinking stays in close contact with the contours of the world, listening closely and in silence to its mysterious intermittent signals. Somewhere, Santayana writes that laughter and worship are the two things that take us beyond the boundaries of this world. I would say the opposite: that laughter and worship are what bind us to the world more tightly than anything else. The same holds for thinking as a whole, which, cements us to the universe rather than freeing us from it, since freedom really occurs only in the self-aborption of laziness, indifference, selfishness, or animal need. In this sense, any engineer who invents a new electronic device is already far more of a thinker than the critical Heideggerian intellectual who complains vaguely that we should "stop and think" before using the tool. If the machine in question is truly an abominable invention, then it is best opposed not by some anemic critical proofreading of its possible misdeeds, but rather by a compelling invocation of all the counter­ machinery threatened by the new device (marshland, folk dances, the autonomy of local farmers). For similar reasons, it is a weak criticism of a historical work to com­ plain loosely that it has not "proven" all of its claims; a stronger critique would be to summon up all of the major historical actors that were down­ played or omitted in the historian's account. Likewise, it is relatively fruit­ less to scan through a philosopher's book and expose its numerous redundancies and non sequiturs as analytic philosophy trains us to do; far more devastating is to place before the reader a series of questions that the philosopher never posed, the neighboring ideas never ventured, the ignored new alternatives never considered, or the simple predictability, nit­ picking tedium, and lack of gambler's spirit in the work lying before us. While relatively few books are hopelessly riddled with errors, numerous books are too boring to be worth our time. What is most important is never critique, but invention and counter­ invention. As Michel Serres puts it: "philosophy is an anticipation of future thoughts and practices . . . Not only must philosophy invent, but it also invents the common ground for future inventions. Its function is to invent the conditions of invention.,,24 To invent always means to put oneself in motion along with what is invented, to hitch oneself to the wagon wherever it goes, to travel elsewhere than one was. By contrast, to critique with­ out innovating implies that we remain where we already stand and merely chop down the trees planted by others, the reactionary gesture par excellence. If enlightenment was once a matter of debunking traditional pieties, it should now be a matter of creating new ones-not arbitrarily, but rigorously and in accordance with the demands of the tectonic plates of the world. Unfortunately, there are moments when it seems that the most treasured whipping boy of the critical intellectual is still the Wizard of Oz, the hypocritical zero who manipulates the world with illusions until his curtain is finally torn to shreds and his deceptions exposed. While such debunking may be necessary work at times, we should not forget that it is mainly the work of dogs (cynics, to say it in Greek). And instead of releasing seven hundred dogs from the city pound to tear away even more curtains and expose ever more frauds by the mighty, the work of the thinker should be to find the counter-wizard, or to pave the way for him oneself.

#### 3. They link to themselves – if any human attempt to shape the world is anthropocentric, asking you to vote negative links to the K. If the K is true it can’t be a reason to vote neg – only a risk of our offense

#### Humans are different from other animals – inevitably causes human-centeredness

Lee, Philosophy Professor at Bloomsburg, ‘9 (Wendy, Spring, “Restoring Human-Centerednes to Environmental Conscience: The Ecocentrist's Dilemma, the Role of Heterosexualized Anthropomorphizing, and the Significance of Language to Ecological Feminism” Ethics and the Environment, Vol 14 No 1, Project Muse)

However plastic and evolving the somatic, perceptual, cognitive, psychological, epistemic and affective capacities native to Homo sapiens, they are still specific to human—and not Chimpanzee or dolphin—being. Human consciousness is, in other words, informed by the unique articulation and interaction of capacities that characterize human embodiment, capacities whose exercise creates the conditions for human experience. To be clear, I am not suggesting that what defines human-centeredness is that human beings have capacities that other species of creatures do not—this may or may not be true given any particular comparison. What I am suggesting is that the unique configuration of capacities that describes Homo sapiens informs an experience unique to this species and thereby define this consciousness in terms of this configuration. A human-centered consciousness cannot then be displaced, disavowed, or disowned—the notion that we could get "outside" of human centeredness makes as little sense as the notion that there's an "outside" for human consciousness (other than permanent coma or death). Hence, I can care profoundly about the welfare of chimpanzees—I can try to imagine what it might be like to be a chimpanzee, and I might make excellent guesses given all of the perceptual, somatic, and psychological similarities we do appear to share in light of the behavioral, anatomical, and other evidence. But I cannot experience the world like a chimpanzee because there is no "outside" to my experience as a member of Homo sapiens.2 Philosophy of language and empirically oriented philosophies of mind/brain may offer the most persuasive support for this position. Douglas Hofstadter argues, for example, that part of what distinguishes human beings from other species of animal is our specifically linguistic capacity for the crafting of analogies: "We human beings begin life as rather austere analogy-makers—our set of categories is terribly sparse, and each category itself is hardly well-honed. Categories grow sharper and sharper and ever more flexible and subtle as we age, and of course fantastically [End Page 31] more numerous" (2000, 121). Similarly, Nicholas Wade argues that the aboriginal click languages still in use in South Africa demonstrate a capacity for the development of language and its acquisition unique even to ancient human communities (2004, 191–4). In their now famous work, Philosophy in the Flesh, George Lakoff and Mark Johnson argue that human beings "are the only animals we know of who can ask, and sometimes even explain, why things happen the way they do. We are the only animals who ponder the meaning of their existence and who worry constantly about love, sex, work, death, and morality. And we appear to be the only animals who can reflect critically on their lives in order to make changes in how they behave" (1999, 551). The most persuasive argument, however, may come from philosopher of mind, Daniel Dennett who, in Consciousness Explained (1991) asks: Do our selves, our nonminimal selfy selves, exhibit the same permeability and flexibility of boundaries as the simpler selves of other creatures? Do we expand our personal boundaries—the boundaries of our selves—to enclose any of our "stuff"? In general, perhaps, no, but there are certainly times when this seems true, psychologically…. So sometimes we enlarge our boundaries; at other times, in response to perceived challenges real or imaginary, we let our boundaries shrink…. I have reminded you of these familiar speeches to draw out the similarities between ourselves and the selves of ants and hermit crabs…Ants and hermit crabs don't talk. The hermit crab is designed in such a way as to see to it that it acquires a shell, and hence, in a very weak sense, tacitly represents the crab as having a shell, but the crab does not in any stronger sense represent itself as having a shell. It doesn't go in for self-representation at all.

#### Given that inevitability, the attempt of the alternative causes us to give up and abandon all ethical engagement with the environment

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A second difficulty is that if Bender is correct that the centeredness of human consciousness predisposes (or just is) chauvinistic, then either we really are doomed to continue the ecocidal trajectory of our history or, as Bender argues, we must disavow our human-centeredness

in favor of an ecocentric ("non-dualist") perspective and practice (2003, 397–404, 445–9). Hence a first version of the ecocentrist's dilemma: If the ecocentrist is wrong, and it turns out that human-centeredness (qua chauvinistic) is an ineradicable feature of human consciousness (at least short of suicide), then we're doomed to precisely the environmental destruction Bender chronicles in impressive (if however despairing) detail in The Culture of Extinction. We are, in other words determined to "dominate the earth!" in which case we may as well just "hang it up," head out to buy Hummers, and buy stock in Shell. This, of course, is not a conclusion Bender (or any of us) would find acceptable. But if, alternatively, the ecocentrist is right, he/she must show how it is possible—at the level of conscious experience—to dissociate that experience from the centered "I" of the subject who, in other words, has it in mind to accomplish the disavowal of the presumably egoistic self and permanently redirect consciousness towards the eco-centric.3

#### Rejecting human-centeredness destroys feminist tools for dismantling chauvinistic approaches to the environment that their author claims is the root cause of their harms

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By insisting that the only way to escape ecocide is to disavow precisely that which women have been systematically denied for virtually [End Page 46] the whole of human history—the opportunity to experience and develop a humanly-centered self—Bender effectively reproduces in ecocentrism the male privilege he otherwise eschews. Who, after all, is in a position to disavow their self-interest but those who have enjoyed the material opportunity to realize it? Who are these if not primarily white, Western men? As Bruno Latour puts it: "it is simply a matter of asking the militant ecologists to stop being so naïve as to believe that they are defending, under cover of nature, something other than a particular viewpoint, that of Westerners. When they speak of putting an end to anthropocentrism, they manifest their own ethnocentrism" (2002, 32). That male privilege is built into Bender's view is not surprising—it follows from the conflation of human-centeredness with human chauvinism, all the while failing to register the significance of the historical fact that the "lion's share" of environmental destruction has been sponsored, financed, and wrought by men (pun intended). The central point, however, is that this criticism applies to any ecocentric perspective: First, philosophically—because the best arguments for ecocentrism turn out to be question begging. And second, practically—because the failure to recognize that human chauvinism assumes a prerogative enjoyed primarily by men risks the reproduction of future oppression, even in an ecologically sustainable "utopia." In short, where among the most foresightful versions of ecocentrism, Bender's and Acampora's, fail to lay down the welcome mat for women—particularly feminists—ecocentrism is in trouble. That ecological feminists might respond to Bender's moral axiom "form one body with all beings" with incredulity in the face of a history of oppression also makes Martin's point all the more compelling—that we anthropomorphize the actions of cells at all raises the first question with respect to who benefits from the use of the intentional stance. In other words, human chauvinism is not about human benefit per se, but about who benefits. Heterosexualist anthropomorphizing simply reinforces a construction of "who" that guarantees such benefits to those identified not as passive recipient "eggs," but as active and deliberate "sperms." Dennett, however, is also correct—there remains an important place in the explanation of behavior, including scientific explanation, for attributing human characteristics to nonhuman animals and things. In fact, it is hard to imagine the sciences without the powerful explanatory tool provided by this "as if." It is, however, at the very juncture of the "as if" [End Page 47] that the crucial link between environmental responsibility and social justice is forged. Why? Because the moment we treat something as if she/he/it exhibited human qualities, we have already gendered and heterosexualized her/him/it via the norms naturalized by our "forms of life." This is so not because we cannot do otherwise, but because the use of gendered and heterosexualizing language is basic to the ways in which we experience a world whose most fundamental institutions—family, government, military, capitalist enterprise, and religion—remain dominated by those men who promote their ideologies and are responsible for the ongoing commodification and exploitation of women, nonhuman animals, indigenous peoples, and the environment. The "how," then, of the role of human institutions matters to the development of an environmental conscience precisely because these institutions could have evolved differently, because they are changeable—the essential ingredient in both environmental activism and the struggle for social justice. Human-centeredness is not necessarily chauvinistic—and if it is, even those who have benefited from it will ultimately come to pay the price that so many others have paid already, namely, in the ecocide that continuing environmental abuse will generate. Coming then, as Ludwig Wittgenstein might have put it, to a more perspicuous understanding of the role of anthropomorphizing language in our "forms of life" supplies us with a key tool toward developing the only conscience that stands any hope of delivering us to a future for human consciousness, that is, a future centered on the responsibility only human beings can take (1953, para.19).

#### Human centeredness does not cause destruction of minority cultures or peoples

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Second, then, is that however indigenous, no necessary implications for ethnicity, gender, sex, or sexual identity follow from human-centeredness (or follow for our concepts of ethnicity, etc.). That we are, for instance, bipedal, color vision equipped, big-brained, sentient mammals implies no particular trajectory for human institutions other than for what falls within the range of physical, cognitive, and epistemic possibility for this species of animal. That we cannot see out the backs of our heads no doubt affects our experience of our somatic and existential conditions, that we are sentient creatures able to experience not only physical but psychological pain certainly contributes substantially to the ways in which our points of view identify us as specific loci of experience. Specific capacities and limitations are not, however, determinations—while species membership delimits the possible, it does not define, for example, the "normal" or "natural" in any other terms but what can be. Nothing necessarily follows for human institutions like government, marriage, or family, however otherwise chauvinistic, sexist, racist, or heterosexist they may be. While human-centeredness is a defining characteristic of human consciousness, the ways in which we realize it is not.